The story was repeated across the globe as the source, whose real name is rafid ahmed alwan aljanabi, said that he lied about iraq s weapons of mass destruction wmd. Iraq bioweapons claim a lie, curveball says the new. There is a myth about the war that i have been meaning to set straight for years. Agent curveball and iraq wmd intelligence doubts top. Feb 15, 2011 defector admits to wmd lies that triggered iraq war. The twoway joschka fischer says the german intelligence agency. The role of intelligence in the 2003 invasion of iraq. Needless to say, however, the iraq war was not sold to the public on. Dec 29, 2017 the official rationale for the war was a claim by the us intelligence community that the saddam regime possessed weapons of mass destruction wmds that could endanger regional and global security.
Defector admits to wmd lies that triggered iraq war world news. Oct 10, 2008 source of iraq wmd intelligence tells his story. Take the case of a man codenamed curveball, an iraqi who defected to germany in 1999 and lived under the control of that countrys intelligence. The intelligence communitys performance in assessing iraq s prewar weapons of mass destruction programs was a major intelligence failure. Commission on the intelligence capabilities of the united states.
He gave many hours of testimony about iraq s wmd program and in particular its mobile weapons laboratories. Curveballs role in iraq intelligence catches up with. The claim of an intelligence failure obscures the truth that the. News world world politics man whose wmd lies led to 100,000 deaths confesses all. Iraq actively researched and later employed weapons of mass destruction from 1962 to. The case of weapons of mass destruction at the outset of the iraq war david c. Mar 31, 2005 but the iraq survey group set up to look for weapons of mass destruction or evidence of them in the country issued a final report saying it saw no weapons or no evidence that iraq was trying. Janabi, who lives in germany, has given several interviews in the past, but until now has always denied that he had lied to his intelligence handlers before the war in iraq, even though his. Bushs cia briefer admits iraq wmd intelligence was a lie former cia deputy director and intelligence briefer michael morell appeared on msnbcs hardball on tuesday. It is also another story of serious mistakes by american intelligence in the run up to the iraq invasion after 911. The case of curveball, the source of the germans who lied in. Senate report on prewar intelligence on iraq wikipedia. Commission on the intelligence capabilities of the united.
Curveball defector admits to wmd lies that triggered iraq war. In the midst of the continuing postwar controversy over intelligence estimates of iraqi weapons of mass destruction program, director of central intelligence george tenet gave this speech in which he addressed how the united states intelligence community evaluated iraq s weapons of mass destruction programs over the past decade, leading to a. Intelligence is always partial, and part will be wrong. The german intelligence officials responsible for one of the most important informants on saddam husseins suspected weapons of mass destruction say that the bush administration and the cia. Preiraq war intelligence on wmds was clear, condoleezza rice. Heavily edited version of the documentary the spies who fooled the world full version below showing how bogus intelligence was twisted to start a war with iraq. We talked to intelligence sources, to people who knew curve ball and to. The office of public affairs opa is the single point of contact for all inquiries about the central intelligence agency cia. Curveball answers the crucial question of the iraq war. The intelligence communitys performance in assessing iraqs prewar weapons of mass destruction programs was a major intelligence failure. Furthermore, ritter explained, the anthrax that iraq had produced had a shelf life that would have rendered it useless many years prior.
Chalabi continued to gather intelligence from iraq that would further his cause. He stated that iraqi sarin and tabun have a shelf life of approximately five years. Bush administrations lies about iraqs wmd unraveling. In combination, the dissemination of these two reports would have immediately alerted experts doing the work on iraq wmd issues across the intelligence community to a problem requiring further resolution. Apr 01, 2005 the intelligence service was crippled by its inability to collect meaningful intelligence on iraq s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs, it said, and fell back on old assumptions. These are the same people that said saddam hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Jun 22, 2003 the senate intelligence committee is investigating whether intelligence assessments about iraqs weapons of mass destruction wmd were full of honest or dishonest mistakes, or whether temperate. Defector tells how us officials sexed up his fictions to make the case for 2003 invasion. For the truth, we now know, was that iraq was playing a deadly game of doublebluff, and actually had no wmd. House of representatives committees inquiry into intelligence on iraq s weapons of mass destruction wmd on monday, 1st march 2004, the parliamentary joint committee on asio, asis and dsd tabled its report on the intelligence on iraq s weapons of mass destruction.
Apr 03, 2012 curveball, man who lied about wmds, comes clean. The cornerstone document on iraq s wmd before the war was the national intelligence estimate on iraq s wmd published in october 2002. Intelligence from highlyplaced sources suggesting that saddam hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction was available before the 2003 invasion of iraq, panorama has learned. Despite feverish searches by the army and cia operatives, no signs of their existence were found in iraq. In the summer of 1994, the bnd german intelligence conducted a major study to estimate the magnitude of the as at that time still undeclared and concealed iraqi wmd arsenal, relying on sales records in its possession of postgulf war german, austrian, and swiss exports of technologies, subsystems and strategic materials to iraq. The nie is done some months later, and this white paper is just on the shelf.
The twoway the intelligence indicating that iraq had weapons of mass destruction was as clear as any. Hitting tenet and powell with a curveball on iraq wmd. As an incentive to keep supplying information to german intelligence, curveball had been granted asylum, as he had applied earlier in 1999 and failed. The issue of shelf life is critical to assessments of the current stockpile of iraqi chemical. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or imploying us government endorsement of an articles factual statements and interpretations. Curveball confesses to lying on iraqi wmd analysis nti. The iraqi defector once known as curveball has said his assertions on prewar iraq s wmd capabilities were fabrications aimed at toppling saddam husseins regime, the london guardian reported today see gsn, feb. Did the process of changing the strategy in iraq reflect the same failure to adapt to an unconventional war as that which had plagued the intelligence community with regard to global terrorism.
Jul, 2004 the senate intelligence committee has issued a scathing report of the cias pre. After no wmds were found, the left claimed bush lied. The committee released its first report on july 9, 2004, which focused primarily on the intelligence communitys prewar assessments of iraqs weapons of mass destruction programs and links to terrorism. Curveball, man who lied about wmds, comes clean the. Bushs iraq commission and the intelligence failure fraud part one by barry grey 7 february 2004 this is the first of a threepart article. The intelligence officers bookshelf central intelligence agency. The shocks jolted americans out of the complacency about national security that they had enjoyed during. As curveball watched powell make the us case to invade iraq, he was hiding an admission that he has not made until now. The intelligence officers bookshelf central intelligence. The intelligence officers bookshelf intelligence in recent public literature. Curveball rafid alwan remained in hiding in germany. When it is put to him we went to war in iraq on a lie.
Did saddam hussein have weapons of mass destruction. This report forms part of a second phase of the sscis investigation of iraq intelligence issues, most especially saddam husseins possible weapons of mass destruction wmd program, originally approved by the intelligence committee in february 2004 but stalled by its republican majority for several years, until the majority changed with the current 110th congress. Betts al qaedas surprise attacks on the world trade center and the pentagon were the u. Tracey george tenet, director of central intelligence dci and his deputy john mclaughlin went to the white house on sunday, december 21, 2002 to brief the president, vicepresident and the national security advisor on the intelligence regarding iraq s nuclear, chemical, biological and. Spin, scandal, and the selling of the iraq warmichael isikoff and david corn. There were also serious shortcomings in the way these assessments were made and communicated to policymakers. Defector admits to wmd lies that triggered iraq war. Rafid ahmed alwan aljanabi, codenamed curveball by german and american intelligence officials who dealt with his claims, has told the. Those findings helped lay the foundation for some of the intelligence reforms enacted into law in late 2004. A thesis submitted to the faculty of the school of continuing studies and of the graduate school of arts and sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in liberal studies by dione brunson, b. Part of iraq wmd intelligence was lifted straight from. So the lessons learned on intelligence are the sort of stuff they teach recruits in the induction courses, the verities drenched with blood from iraq.
The lies that led to the iraq war and the myth of intelligence failure. Ricks says that although doubts about curveball were presented to intelligence officials before the speech, they were ignored. Curveball s role in iraq intelligence catches up with him originally published june 18, 2008 at 12. Curveball, the iraqi who fabricated claims about iraq s weapons of mass destruction confirms how he made the whole thing up. Spies, lies, and the con man who caused a war is an examination of the refugee from iraq, code named curveball, who contended that he had been involved in wmd biological warfare research and development. Analysis the october 02 national intelligence estimate the dark.
We judge that iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction wmd. The senate report on iraqi wmd intelligence was the report by the united states senate select committee on intelligence concerning the u. So it was deeply troubling, and i think that it was a great intelligence failure on our part, because the problems that existed in that nie should have been recognized and caught earlier by the. The bush administrations reliance on a secret source, codenamed curveball, to make its case that iraq was harboring weapons of mass destruction is one of the great embarrassments of the runup to. According to the committee, claims made by the cia that saddam hussein. Jul 06, 2016 part of iraq wmd intelligence was lifted straight from hollywood movie the rock key sections of the intel used to justify war bore more resemblance to the rock, starring sean connery and. Man whose wmd lies led to 100,000 deaths confesses all. The report found that these failures led to the creation of inaccurate materials that misled both government policy makers and t. Rafid ahmed alwan aljanabi known by the defense intelligence agency cryptonym. Defector admits to wmd lies that triggered iraq war world. He gave many hours of testimony about iraqs wmd program and in particular its mobile weapons laboratories. The iraqi defector rafid aljanabi codenamed curveball, who falsely claimed saddam hussein had weapons of mass destruction, admitted to the.
This report forms part of a second phase of the sscis investigation of iraq intelligence issues, most especially saddam husseins possible weapons of mass destruction wmd program, originally approved by the intelligence committee in february 2004 but stalled by its republican majority for several years, until the majority changed with. The lies that started the iraq war agent curveball youtube. Furthermore, ritter explained, the anthrax that iraq had produced had a shelf life that would have. The failure was not merely that the intelligence communitys assessments were wrong. President bush holds a press briefing at the white house on friday, february 6, 2004, announcing the formation of the commission. In one case, the intelligence community failed to provide enough warning. The phony bad intel defense on iraq consortiumnews. Presidential commission on the intelligence capabilities of. An iraqi defector codenamed curveball admits that he made up stories about mobile bioweapons trucks and secret factories to try to bring down saddam hussein s regime. The curveball affair by john prados on february 5, 2003, secretary of state colin powell made a dramatic presentation before the united nations security council, detailing a u. He is flanked by commission cochairs senator charles robb left and judge laurence silberman right. He gave many hours of testimony about iraq s wmd program and in.
Phillip bobbitt highlights the importance of the curveball source in the 2002 nie, where the information being published about iraq s biological weapons capability came almost exclusively from curveball, despite the assertion that there were multiple sources bobbitt, 2009, p. House of representatives committees pjcaad wmd report. Wmd has been the center of political controversy and of. The flaws we found in the intelligence communitys iraq performance are still all too. Bushs honesty by insisting he really believed the bogus intelligence on iraq s wmd and, true, it is impossible to know what. Man whose wmd lies led to over 100,000 deaths confesses all. The intelligence community failed to give adequate consideration to other possible uses for iraq s uavs or to give due credence to countervailing evidence. In 2000, an iraqi defector codenamed curveball told the german intelligence service that baghdad was still working on its wmd and. Operating in a fog of espionage and counterespionage, ritter and his team were determined to find out the truth about iraqs wmd. How and why was americas intelligence so catastrophically wrong. The case of weapons of mass destruction at the outset of the.
We read every letter, fax, or email we receive, and we will convey your comments to cia officials outside opa as appropriate. Curveball denies lying about iraqi wmd analysis nti. The english newspaper the guardian interviewed the infamous iraqi defector curveball in midfebruary 2011. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized administrator. The intelligence community communicates its judgments to senior officials in many ways in verbal briefings, in short memos, and in longer reports. The intelligence community was generally correct in assessing that iraq was continuing ballistic missile work that violated united nations restrictions, but erred in many of the speci. Nov 02, 2011 preiraq war intelligence on wmds was clear, condoleezza rice says. Operating in a fog of espionage and counterespionage, ritter and his team were determined to find out the truth about iraq s wmd. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. The appropriate time to do a national intelligence estimate on iraqs. Bushs iraq commission and the intelligence failure fraud. How us was duped by iraqi fantasist looking to topple.
1178 173 21 1325 223 922 742 1051 1134 1254 5 475 1304 1182 935 910 125 972 1368 1038 689 1113 671 491 1564 1479 1407 932 598 834 202 117 746 980 1484 90 1152 1210 923 1043